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For combined threat and tenacity, few economic problems compare
with the developing-country debt problem. When the Mexican pay-
ments crisis erupted in August 1982, it was the immediate threat to the
stability of the international financial system that concentrated the
minds of policymakers, at least in the creditor countries. However, the
general hope, if not the expectation, was that the severity of the threat
would diminish fairly quickly as the developing countries "adjusted"
their economies, with the assistance of debt rescheduling and some new
lending, so as to restore their creditworthiness and economic growth.
Indeed, the threat has diminished, but not because of successful
adjustment or restoration of creditworthiness in heavily indebted devel-
oping countries. The threat to the financial system has eased as
commercial banks have sharply reduced the share of their assets and
capital exposed to the troubled debtor countries. The countries them-
selves are no better off, however.
The difficulty of the adjustment confronting the 15 heavily indebted
countries--the tenacity of the debt problem--was generally under-
estimated.i This paper analyzes the nature of the adjustment that has
taken place between 1982 and 1987, and, after considering some indexes
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1 U.S. Treasury Department staff report that the "Baker 15" were selected as the 15
countries with the largest external debts, with debt owed primarily to commercial banks
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of creditworthiness, raises the question of why growth has not accom-
panied adjustment.
Despite the lack of economic growth, the heavily indebted countries
generally continue to service their debts, a phenomenon that is explored
in a later section. Also addressed is the issue of debt relief.
The Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Process
In terms of the balance-of-payments accounts, the heavily indebted
countries were confronted at the onset of the crisis with the challenge of
financing a huge increase in interest payments, an increase stemming
from marked rises ir~ both their indebtedness and world interest rates.
The $28 billion surge in these payments from 1979 to 1982 more than
"explains" the accompanying increase in the current account deficit
(table 1). Since capital inflows to finance these interest payments were
not forthcoming, trade balances had to be wrenched into sizable
surplus. Remarkably, the surpluses were generated even though ex-
ports made almost no contribution, being of virtually the same value in
1987 as in 1982, and even smaller than in 1981. The improvement in the .
nominal trade balance was entirely accounted for by import reductions.
If exports of the 15 countries failed to increase in value, it was not
for lack of increase in volume. The volume of exports grew by 23 percent
from 1982 through 1987, but a decline in unit value was fully offsetting.
On the other hand, the price paid by the 15 for imports rose by 3 percent
over this period (IMF October 1988, pp. 84-85).
Whether the 23 percent growth in export volume should be viewed
as a major adjustment effort is questionable. Over the same five-year
period, the volume of world trade grew by 27 percent (IMF October
1988, p. 79). Thus, the 15 lost market share in real terms.
The massive import reductions of 1981-87 could not be effected
without suppressing domestic growth. In no year between 1981 and
1987 did real GDP growth in the 15 countries even approach the average
for 1970-79, and in 1987 per capita GDP was nearly 6 percent below the
level of 1980 (table 2). To be sure, some of this decline represented a
correction of the earlier economic boom, but some also resulted from the
obstacles, internal and external, that these countries encountered in
enlarging their exports.
The decline in economic growth was associated with a decline in
gross investment. Between 1981 and 1987, gross capital formation fell
from 24 percent to 17 percent of GDP in the heavily indebted countries
(IMF October 1988, p. 66). Whether or not such a decline was warranted
on efficiency grounds, the intermediate term prospects for economic
growth seem diminished.Table 1
Current Account Transactions of 15 Heavily Indebted Developing Countries, 1979-87
Billions of U.S. Dollars
Category 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Exports (f.o.b.) 94.2 127.9 127.0 112.2 111 .! 123.4 118.8
Imports (f.o.b.) 96.1 122.4 133,6 108.2 82,8 80.4 78.2
Trade Balance -1.9 5.5 -6.5 4.0 28.3 43.0 40.6
Services, Net -25.8 -36.8 -46.9 -56.9 -46.8 -48.2
Interest Payments Portiona -17.1 -25.5 -37.8 -45.5 -41.3 -46.6
Goods and Services Balance -27.7 -31.3 -53.5 -52.9 -18.6 -5.2
Unrequited Transfers 3.1 2.2 3.2 2.2 3.2 3.6
Current Account Balance -24.6 -29.1 -50.3 -50.8 -15.3 -1.5
Note: Detail may not add to totals shown because of rounding.
a Including dividends and other investment income payments not related to foreign direct investment.
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Table 2
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’~ Compound annual rates of change.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 1988, pp. 64-65.
With the aid of data kindly supplied by the World Bank, the
anatomy of the adjustment in real terms can be examined in greater
detail. For our base year, we select 1982, when the debt crisis erupted
and the need for adjustment became widely perceived, and to facilitate
comparisons we generally use 1982 GNP as a common denominator.2
Our primary focus is on the contributions made to changes in the
volume of net exports by various key components of the national
accounts.
To begin with net exports themselves, we see in table 3 that all but
one of the countries raised its real net exports between 1982 and 1987.
The median change was 5.9 percent of 1982 GNP. The range of
experience was wide, however, extending from -3.9 percent (Bolivia) to
12.7 percent (Venezuela).
The time path of the adjustment seems both suboptimal and
halting. Only four countries--Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Nigeria--
have recorded noteworthy increases in net exports beyond the increases
already reported by 1983 or 1984. And appreciable declines from the
1983 or 1984 levels are evident for three countries--Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Uruguay. Thus, across countries little progress in aggregate adjust-
ment is discernible beyond the progress attained in the first year or two
following the onset of the debt crisis. The front-end loading of the
2 As the pre-crisis peak year, 1981 might have been selected as the base, but GDP data
for that year were highly bloated by the boom. Also, 1982 was the peak year for the current
account deficit.62 Norman S. Fieleke
Table 3
Changes in Net Exports of Goods and Services, in Constant Prices, as
Percentage of 1982 GNP, For Heavily Indebted Developing Countries
Country 1982-83 1982-84 1982-85 1982-86 1982-87
Argentina 1.1 0 6.5 4,3 2.2
Bolivia .3 2.3 -3,5 -3.5 -3.9
Brazil 3.0 5,6 6.7 3.8 5.9
Chile 4.2 -,5 6.4 6,7 7.3
Colombia 1.4 2,5 5.6 6.0 7.2
C6te d’lvoire -.4 8.3 7,2 7.9 7.3
Ecuador 8,2 9.1 10,4 13.3 5.7
Mexico 4,5 4.7 4.7 5.3 10.7
Morocco 3.1 2.5 1.2 1.5 3.4
Nigeria 2.8 6.7 9.3 13.0 12.6
Peru 4.7 10.1 12.7 7.8 9.2
Philippines -.5 3,8 6.8 7.8 3.4
Uruguay 4.8 6.3 7.3 9,0 4.9
Venezuela 10.6 7.5 9.4 8,1 12.7
Yugoslavia ,1 1.0 1,8 1.1 1,0
Median 3.0 4.7 6.7 6.7 5.9
n,a.: not available.
Source: World Bank staff.
aggregate adjustment suggests that, in the early stages, resources were
not given enough time to shift without becoming unemployed, and that,
more recently, aggregate adjustment may virtually have stalled.
Table 4 reveals that the volume of imported goods and nonfactor
services actually shrank in 11 countries between 1982 and 1987. The
typical (median) change with respect to 1982 GNP was a decline of 2.0
percent, although declines of 11 or 12 percent were experienced by C6te
d’Ivoire and Nigeria. In four countries, the decline was large enough to
account for nearly all, or more than all, of their increase in real net
exports.
While import reductions often are an essential ingredient of bal-
ance-of-payments adjustment, they do not necessarily generate equiv-
alent improvements in net exports. Many imports become components
of exports, and domestic substitutes for those imports may not be
readily available. A reduction in such imports, especially if accom-
plished through controls, can force fairly direct reductions in associated
exports (Khan and Knight 1988). Nonetheless, decreases in import
volume over 1982-87 have typically been accompanied by increases in
export volume. Moreover, the reductions in import volume, measured
from 1982, have generally diminished in recent years.
For another perspective on the adjustment process, recall that a
nation can enlarge its net exports only by expanding its output by moreIMBALANCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 63
Table 4
Changes in Imports of Goods and Nonfactor Services, in Constant Prices, as
Percentage of 1982 GNP, for Heavily Indebted Developing Countries
Country 1982-83 1982-84 1982-85 1982-86 1982-87
Argentina -1.1 0 -2.2 0 1.1
Bolivia .7 -1.4 .7 4.1 4,6
Brazil -1.7 -2.0 -2.0 0,1 -1.8
Chile -4,0 -.3 -3.2 -.9 3.4
Colombia -2.0 -2.7 -4.0 -3,5 -2.6
C6te d’lvoire -4,0 -7.8 -10,3 -10.6 -11.3
Ecuador -7.6 -8.1 -6,5 -6,7 -3.9
Mexico -3.1 -2.1 - 1.1 -2.3 -2.0
Morocco -2,4 -1.6 -1.6 -.1 -.5
Nigeria -3.8 -6.5 -7,4 -10.3 -11.9
Peru -8,3 -11.9 -13,3 -9.5 -8.8
Philippines 2.4 -1.3 -5,6 -2,0 2.5
Uruguay -4.6 -7.3 -7.1 -3.4 -1.4
Venezuela -11.8 -5.9 -7.6 -4.6 -6.7
Yugoslavia - 1.3 - 1.4 - 1.5 -.7 -2.0
Median -3,1 -2.1 -4,0 -2.3 -2.0
Source: World Bank staff.
than its domestic absorption of goods and services, or by shrinking its
absorption by more than its output. Thus, the changes shown for GNP
and absorption for each country in table 5 yield the net change in the
country’s net exports reported in table 3 (except for rounding errors).
For most people, the preferred way to expand net exports would be to
expand GNP, but both economic advisers and markets are more
effective at restraining absorption, especially in the short run.
In fact, between 1982 and 1987 absorption decreased in 8 of the 15
countries with the median change for all 15 amounting to -2.2 percent
of 1982 GNP. Nonetheless, in none of the countries was absorption in
1987 below that in 1983 or 1984, again indicating that the adjustment
"crunch" came several years ago. The range of experience is striking.
While Nigeria suffered a reduction in absorption amounting in 1987 to 19
percent of 1982 GNP, Brazil enjoyed a 21 percent increase. Of course,
unchanged aggregate absorption implies a substantial per capita reduc-
tion for the typical country.
Far from achieving adjustment with growth, three countries--
Bolivia, Nigeria, and the Philippines--recorded reductions in real GNP
between 1982 and 1987. Bolivia was the only one whose output fell even
more than absorption, producing a decline in net exports. Although a
few countries attained significant GNP growth over the five years, the
median change was only 3.6 percent.Table 5
Changes in Output (GNP) and Absorption (A) as Percentage of 1982 GNP for Heavily Indebted Developing Countries
1982-83 1982-84 1982-85 1982-86 1982-87
















Argentina 2.2 1.1 4.3 4.3 1.1 -4.3 8.6 5.4
Bolivia -6.0 -5.9 -5,9 -8.1 -7,5 -4.0 -9,2 -5.8
Brazil -3.3 -6.2 2.3 -3.3 11.4 4.8 21.7 17.9
Chile -,7 -5.0 3.2 3.7 8.0 1.6 14,2 7.5
Colombia 1.2 -.2 3.6 1.1 6.5 1.0 10.6 4.6
C6te d’lvoire -3.4 3,0 -5,0 - 13.2 -2.7 -9.9 3.5 -4.4
Ecuador -2.9 -~11.1 -.9 -10.0 3,8 -6.6 7.5 -5,7
Mexico -5,0 -9.5 -1.0 -5.7 3,4 -1.3 -1,7 -7.0
Morocco 1,9 - 1.2 3,9 1.5 6.8 5.6 14.9 13.3
Nigeria -5.4 -8.2 - 13.0 - 19.6 -5,2 - 14,5 -.8 - 13.8
Peru - 13.9 - 18.6 -9.8 -19.8 -7.3 -20,0 4.0 -3.8
Philippines 1.2 1.7 -6,1 -9.8 -9.9 -16.7 -8.1 - 15,9
Uruguay -8,7 -13.5 -11.5 -17.8 -11,1 -18.3 -2,7 -11.7
Venezuela -4.4 - 14.9 -6.4 -13.9 -5,2 - 14.6 1.8 -6.3
Yugoslavia - 1,2 - 1.4 .4 -.6 .9 - 1.0 5,2 4.1
Median -3.3 -5.9 -1.0 -8.1 .9 -4.3 4.0 -4.4 3.6

















-2.2IMBALANCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 65
Have the countries with the greater GNP or GDP growth been more
successful in adjusting (enlarging) their real net exports (in relation to
1982 GNP or GDP)? The answer is negative; the correlation between
growth and adjustment over the five years is virtually zero. Perhaps this
finding should not be surprising. The nations with the higher growth
rates may have attained those rates precisely because they were under
less pressure to adjust, perhaps benefiting from more favorable terms of
trade than other debtors or from more favorable appraisals by foreign
lenders.
Is a sharp recession early in the adjustment process a good
purgative, promoting external adjustment? Not obviously so; among
this group of countries, no significant correlation obtains between the
rate of real GNP change from 1982-83 and the change in net exports (as
percent of 1982 GNP) from 1982-87.
As already noted, the typical heavily indebted country has been
obliged to exercise severe restraint over its domestic absorption of goods
and services. Now, not only the level but the composition of absorption
is of considerable interest. Reductions in consumption may be more
painful in the short run, but less painful in the long run, than
investment reductions that lower future growth rates.
In table 6 we observe that the burden of restraining absorption has
generally fallen primarily on gross domestic investment and secondarily
on government consumption. Private consumption, with a median
change of 5.8 percent of 1982 GNP, has grown in all but two of the 15
countries. The two, Mexico and Nigeria, suffered cuts in private con-
sumption of 2.2 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively. (Because of the
statistical discrepancy, PC, GC, and GDI in table 6 may not add to A in
table 5.)
Gross domestic investment diminished in the typical country by 5.2
percent of 1982 GNP over the five-year period. In 12 countries invest-
ment declined. Even in Brazil, where GNP grew by nearly 27 percent,
gross domestic investment increased by only 1.3 percent of 1982 GNP.
The only country where investment increased notably in relation to 1982
GNP was Chile, with a remarkable gain of more than 11 percent.
Substantial restraint has been imposed on government consump-
tion. The median experience from 1982-87 for the 12 countries reported
was almost no change, and the largest increase was only 4.8 percent of
1982 GNP (Morocco).
Because absorption restraint has fallen so heavily on investment,
GNP growth may be slow to recover. This is not to say that reductions
in investment were unwarranted. During the pre-crisis boom, invest-
ment surely became excessive, yielding at the margin less than the
socially relevant rate of interest. Thus, analyses of the debt problem may
have placed too much emphasis on raising the supply of investable66 Norman S. Fieleke
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funds to the heavily indebted countries and not enough emphasis on
raising the productivity of investment.3
The importance of raising the efficiency of investment in problem
debtor countries is suggested by recent estimates of total factor produc-
tivity for the period 1982-87. For countries with recent debt servicing
problems, total factor productivity growth was estimated to be negative,
subtracting three-quarters of 1 percent per annum from the growth of
potential output. By contrast, in developing countries without debt
servicing problems, growth in total factor productivity contributed an
estimated 1.25 percent per year to potential output (IMF 1988, p. 31).
Finally, in this brief empirical survey of the adjustment process, we
turn our attention to the commodity terms of trade, and we pose the
follOwing counterfactual: If export prices received by the heavily in-
debted countries could have been adjusted each year so as to bear the
same ratio to import prices as in 1982, with other things equal, how
would those countries’ trade balances have been changed? The answer
is presented in table 7, which reports, for the end year of each period,
the amount by which actual net exports exceed or fall short of net
exports valued at the 1982 terms of trade, as a percentage of nominal
GNP. For 8 of the 15 countries, actual net exports in 1987 fell short of
what they would have been if the 1982 terms of trade had prevailed. The
median was a shortfall of 1.5 percent of 1987 GNP. For Nigeria, this loss
amounted to a startling 38 percent of 1987 GNP.
With respect to the terms of trade, another relevant question is
whether the countries experiencing the greater deteriorations in their
commodity terms of trade have also recorded the greater deteriorations
(or the smaller improvements) in the value of net exports as a percentage
of nominal GNP, as reported in table 8. The correlation coefficient is 0.59
and is significant at the 0.05 level under a two-tail test. A stringent
two-tail test is appropriate, because theory offers no strong presumption
as to the direction of the effect of terms-of-trade changes on the current
account balance (Sen and Turnovsky 1988). The relationship suggested
by the correlation analysis should, of course, be subjected to more
rigorous econometric testing than is feasible in this survey.
Is Creditworthiness Being Restored?
After six years of struggling, are the heavily indebted countries in
better position to service their debts, and to assume new debt? Indica-
tors of creditworthiness commonly consulted by lenders to these nations
present a mixed picture (table 9). While ratios of debt to exports and to
3 Vito Tanzi argues along these lines (Tanzi 1988, p. iii).68 Norman S. Fieleke
Table 7
Hypothetical Changes in Value of Net Exports of Goods and Nonfactor
Services Attributable to Changes in Terms of Trade, as Percent of End of
Period Nominal GNP, for Heavily Indebted Developing Countries
Country 1982-83 1982-84 1982-85 1982-86 1982-87
Argentina .3 1.0 -,9 -2.0 -2.6
Bolivia -,5 -.8 1.4 -7,2 -9.2
Brazil -.1 .9 .1 1,3 .8
Chile 1.1 -,9 -2.5 -2.2 1,1
Colombia .1 .7 1,3 4.1 3.1
C6te d’lvoire ,7 6.9 6.5 7.3 1.3
Ecuador -.5 - 1.7 -4.4 - 15.3 - 14.0
Mexico -5.3 -4,7 -5.2 -12.2 -6.0
Morocco .4 .2 ,7 3.0 2.7
Nigeria -,9 -.9 1,8 - 16.8 -37.5
Peru .2 .1 -1,9 -2,1 -1,5
Philippines 1.4 2,2 1.6 5.4 4,7
Uruguay -2.5 -4,3 -5.3 - 1.0 .1
Venezuela -,8 5.3 1.0 -7.2 - 13.4
Yugoslavia -.3 -2.3 -3,0 ,3 -2,3
Median -.1 .1 .1 -2.0 -1.5
Source: World Bank staff.
GDP were much higher in 1987 than when the crisis erupted, debt
service ratios were much lower.
These indicators resemble the leading economic indicators used to
forecast business cycles, in that they constitute measurement without
much underlying theory, and their movements can mislead the unwary.
For example, a country in outright default and paying no debt service
would have the lowest possible ratio of service paid. More generally, all
such ratios provide very little information about the capacity of a nation
to service additional debt. That capacity depends on the ability both to
employ capital productively and, when necessary, to tap the proceeds,
an ability that could differ sharply among nations having the same debt
service ratios.
In the present instance, the sharp decline in the debt service ratio in
1987 was associated with debt relief amounting to some 9 percent of
exports--a record high rather than with marked favorable changes in
fundamentals such as market interest rates or export demand (IMF 1988,
p. 19). Such a development hardly testifies to the ability of the heavily
indebted countries to service still more debt--although it is possible that
they could do so, if sound investment projects were waiting in the
wings.
Another index of creditworthiness is capital flight. Flight capital
may be defined as capital withdrawn out of fear of large losses, so thatIMBALANCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 69
Table 8
Net Exports of Goods and Services as Percentage of Nominal GNP, for Heavily
Indebted Developing Countries
Change
Country 1982 1987 1982-87
Argentina -5.8 -6,6 -.8
Bolivia -3.5 - 16.3 - 12,8
Brazil -6,3 -,5 5,8
Chile -9.9 -4,6 5.3
Colombia -5.9 ,3 6.2
C6te d’lvoire -10.3 -1.7 8.6
Ecuador - 10.5 - 16.4 - 5.9
Mexico -,7 .1 .8
Morocco -20.2 -10.0 10.2
Nigeria -7.7 -1.7 6.0
Peru -9.9 -3,0 6,9
Philippines -8.4 ,1 8.5
Uruguay -5.3 - 1.8 3.5
Venezuela -4.6 -2.0 2,6
Yugoslavia -2.5 -2,3 .2
Median -6,3 -2,0 5,3
Source: World Bank staff.
massive flight signifies a sharp loss of confidence by many investors in
the creditworthiness of the afflicted nation. Because one cannot know
what portion of a capital outflow is provoked by fear of large losses
rather than by less dramatic investment motivations, capital flight
cannot be measured directly. Indeed, the flight may go altogether
unrecorded, since the withdrawals are often made through channels
that evade both normal reporting requirements and governmental
restraint. Ironically, this very evasiveness has provided the basis for
some measures of capital flight, the quintessential example being the
"errors and omissions" item in the balance-of-payments accounts. Large
swings in errors and omissions have long been attributed chiefly to
unreported capital movements, and these swings may offer a crude
barometer of capital flight.4
The barometric readings in table 9 suggest that the storm has
subsided considerably from the peak intensity of 1982. It is not so easy
as it was some years ago to make the case that funds loaned to the
heavily indebted countries are used merely to finance capital flight.
Even more encouraging, of course, would be some sizable positive
4 For a comparison of alternative measures of capital flight, see Cumby and Levich
(1987).Table 9
Debt Indicators and Balance-of-Payments Errors and Omissions for Heavily Indebted Developing Countries, 1980-87
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
External Debta as Percent of:
Exports of Goods and Services 168 202 268 291 272 290 348 337
Gross Domestic Product 33 38 42 47 46 46 47 50
Debt Serviceb as Percent of
Exports of Goods and Services
Total 29 39 50 40 40 39 43 35
Interest Portion 16 23 31 29 29 29 28 22
Balance-of-Payments
Errors and Omissions
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) -8.1 -15.4 -17.0 -10.0
a Long-term and short-term debt at end of year, but excluding debt owed to IMF.
b Interest payments on total debt plus amortization payments on long-term debt only, excluding payments to IMF.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 1988, pp. 115, 128-31.
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entries for errors and omissions, suggesting the repatriation of capital
that had flown and a concomitant surge in confidence.
Those with strong confidence in market valuations will form their
impressions of creditworthiness not so much from the data in table 9 as
from the data plotted in the figure. As shown, the weighted average
secondary market discount for the debt of the 15 heavily indebted
countries widened from 30 percent at the beginning of 1986 to more than
50 percent in the first half of 1988, even though interest rates in the
industrial countries were generally no higher at the end of this period
than at the outset. To be sure, the market for less developed country
debt is itself less developed, so that quoted prices may sometimes be
misleading; but as the market has become more mature the discount has
hardly diminished. Moreover, according to a recent study by Sachs and
Huizinga, the market values of commercial bank stocks have been in line
with the market valuations of developing country debt held by the
banks (Sachs and Huizinga 1987, pp. 559, 576-87). Thus, the discounts
depicted in the figure may be a fairly good index of the creditworthiness
of the heavily indebted countries.
Rather than examining only the actual changes in such indexes of
creditworthiness, one can compare those changes with earlier projec-
tions. One then obtains a measure of progress against expectations. If
the progress diverges widely from the expectations, investigation of the
reasons may yield helpful insights, leading to improved modeling of the
relevant economic structure.
A preeminent source of forecasts relating to creditworthiness is the
International Monetary Fund. In 1987 the Fund favored us with a flank
analysis of the reasons that one of its earlier projections went awry. This
analysis is summarized in table 10.
Focusing on the non-oil developing countries, the IMF projected in
April 1984 that their external debt would be 132 percent of their exports
of goods and services at the end of 1987. This projection contemplated
a significant improvement from the figure of some 150 percent that had
been published for 1983 (IMF 1984, p. 219). But by October 1987, the
Fund had come to expect a ratio of 170, a number 38 points higher than
the original forecast.
Of this net error, 14 percentage points were attributable to inade-
quate data on external debt, or in more positive phraseology, to progress
in collecting data on debt that had been unknown to the Fund in April
1984. Another contributor to the error, accounting for 13 percentage
points, was unexpected dollar depreciation, which boosted the dollar
value of debt denominated in foreign currencies. Still another positive
contribution, amounting to 19 percentage points, was made by a large,
unforeseen decline in the prices these countries received for their export
goods. Smaller, offsetting errors were generated by greater export72 Norman S. Fieleke
Secondary Market Prices for Developing Country Loans, March
1986 to July 1988a
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a Weighted average prices for 15 heavily indebted countries, where weights are staff estimates of unguaranteed
outstanding commercial bank debt at end-1986, adjusted for maturing short-term debt.
Source: International Monetary Fund,
volume and lower borrowing than had been expected for these coun-
tries.
What did not contribute to the forecast error is at least as notewor-
thy as what did. In particular, none of the error stemmed from a failure
of gross output to grow as rapidly as projected in 1984. For the industrial
countries, the output projections for 1987 made in 1984 and 1987 were
identical; for the non-oil developing countries, the level of the 1987
projection was 1.75 percent higher than the 1984 projection. This fact is
somewhat disquieting, as it raises doubt about the feasibility of adjust-
ment with growth in the developing countries, a matter taken up in the
next section. At a minimum, it is clear that "reasonable growth" in the
industrial countries was not sufficient to improve the debt-to-export
ratio, even with lower borrowing by the non-oil developing countries
than the Fund had projected.IMBALANCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73
Table 10




April 1984 Projection 132
October 1987 Projection 170
"Error" in Projection 38
Projection Error due to:
Data Revisionsb 14
Underlying Forecast Error 24
Forecast Error due to:
Valuation of Debt° 13
New Borrowing -5
Price of Exports 19
Volume of Exports -3
a The debt ratio is defined here as external debt outstanding as a
percentage of exports of goods and services.
b Reflects primarily the improved accounting of external debt statis-
tics.
CReflects primarily the effects of exchange-rate changes.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Oc-
tober 1987, p. 25.
Is Adjustment Compatible with Growth?
In principle, adjustment, or measures to restore creditworthiness,
need not be the nemesis of growth. On the contrary, with effective
expenditure-switching mechanisms that channel output growth into
traded goods, growth should contribute to, rather than interfere with,
balance-of-payments adjustment. The chief issue between "debt opti-
mists" and "debt pessimists" is whether such an outcome is really
attainable for the heavily indebted countries.
Optimists believe that heavily indebted countries will soon begin to
"outgrow" their debts, lowering debt-to-GNP ratios largely through
productivity gains partially financed by new loans from the rest of the
world. For example, in a widely read article in The Economist, Martin
Feldstein showed how Brazil might reduce the ratio of its external debt
to its GNP by 18 percent between 1987 and 1992, "under relatively
conservative assumptions" (including the assumption that Brazil’s net
debt service was limited to 2.5 percent of GNP). Such analysis led him
to conclude that "muddling-through via modest increases in debt and
equity" was the best approach to restoring growth and creditworthiness
(Feldstein 1987). Pessimists doubt that even modest new lending to the
heavily indebted countries is in prospect; or they doubt that new74 Norman S. Fieleke
lending, even if forthcoming, would be very effective in raising output,
especially in relation to absorption.
Through 1987, the weight of the evidence favors the pessimists. Net
lending to the heavily indebted countries remains very low, as indicated
by their small current account deficit. Moreover, GDP growth rates also
remain depressed, especially in per capita terms.
Why has adjustment with growth failed to materialize? Accurate
quantitative answers to this question probably are not possible, but a
number of hypotheses are deserving of serious consideration, including
the following:
(1) Past investments may have been ill-conceived, yielding little or
no return;
(2) Even well-conceived investments have been rendered uneco-
nomic by unforeseeable adverse shifts in the terms of trade and
in real interest rates;
(3) Because of the rapid contraction in new lending, insufficient
time was allowed for an efficient shifting of resources in the
manner called for by long-term adjustment;
(4) Extreme risk aversion has come to characterize the attitude of
potential lenders, who, once burned in lending to heavily
indebted countries, are now twice shy;
(5) Aside from such risk aversion, the debt overhang itself discour-
ages new foreign lending, because new loans, no matter how
productive, may be lumped in with old unproductive loans for
repayment purposes;
(6) Governments of heavily indebted countries have often discour-
aged investment and growth through government dissaving,
overvaluation of their currencies, and uncertainty-generating
policy shifts.
Of course, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but mutually
reinforcing.
With regard to the first hypothesis, anecdotes are legion of hasty
loan commitments to developing countries in the years immediately
preceding the onset of the debt crisis. Many of the investments financed
by these loans seem to have been selected in equal haste. One indication
is the relatively high incremental capital-to-output ratios observed in a
number of countries in the years surrounding the onset of the crisis;
another is very low financial rates of return to public sector investments;IMBALANCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
still another is estimated negative total factor productivity change in
countries with debt-servicing problems.5
Bad judgment was compounded by bad luck, as the terms of trade
turned sharply adverse for the 15 heavily indebted countries. Between
1982 and 1987, the prices of their exports fell by 20 percent in relation to
the prices of their imports (IMF October 1988, p. 88). Moreover, the real
interest rates paid by the developing countries, which had generally
been negative from 1976 to 1980, soared in 1981 and 1982 and hovered
around 13 percent through 1986, before plunging in 1987.6
The third hypothesis recognizes that dramatic changes in funda-
mental economic conditions, such as the changes of the early 1980s, tall
for extensive shifts in resource allocation. Developing country resources
previously devoted to the production of nontraded goods had to be
redirected to the production of exportables and import-competing
goods. Some resource adjustments can be made quickly; others require
more time. The more abruptly a current account deficit must be
eliminated, the more expansion or contraction will occur in those
activities that can respond relatively quickly and easily; and some of this
short-run shifting will have to be reversed eventually as other adapta-
tions, more suitable in the long run, become feasible. Thus, in the short
run the country may expand its output and export of apparel, because it
has the factories and marketing facilities in place. But from the stand-
point of long-run adjustment the workers added to the apparel industry
should perhaps be constructing buildings to house electronic assembly
operations.
No elaboration is probably needed of points 4 and 5. As for the
sixth, private investment is likely to have been diminished by govern-
mental deficits in many heavily indebted countries. As one crude index
of the problem, between 1982 and 1987 central government deficits
ranged from 3.4 to 6.5 percent of GDP for these countries as a group
(IMF October 1988, p. 78). Where the deficits have been to some degree
financed by domestic market borrowings, private investment may have
been crowded out. Commonly, the deficits have been largely financed,
directly or indirectly, by domestic central banks, contributing to intense
inflationary pressure that has also discouraged private investment.
Another deterrent to private investors is the prospect of tax increases,
s On incremental capital/output ratios, see Bianchi (1987, p. 214) and Tanzi (1988, p.
13). On rates of return, see Tanzi (1988, pp. 11-14). Total factor productivity is discussed
in IMF (1988, p. 31).
~ The real interest rate is here defined as the six-month dollar LIBOR divided by the
change in the price of exports of the developing countries (The World Bank 1988a, p. xv).76 Norman S. Fieleke
Table 11
Real Effective Exchange Rates for Selected Developing Countries, 1981-87
1980-82 = 100
Year Argentina Mexico Korea
1981 107.7 114.1 101.2
1982 76.5 81.9 102.9
1983 71.6 79.0 97.6
1984 80.2 91.9 96.5
1985 71.0 90.4 88.7
1986 60.8 65.0 82.1
1987 53.4 66.7 84.0
Note: Where the exchange~rate system entailed multiple rates, the official rate was used in the
calculations.
Source: World Financial Markets, 1988 Issue 7, p. 15, and February 1986, p. 11.
whose nature is uncertain, for the purpose of reducing the deficit in
the future. Indeed, among analysts a clear consensus now exists that the
heavily indebted countries cannot resume sustained, significant growth
in per capita GNP without appreciable reductions in their governmental
deficits.7
Although "overvaluation" is difficult to define operationally, the
sharp depreciations of some developing country currencies during the
1980s at least raise the question whether those currencies had become
severely overvalued, partly in response to excessive government bor-
rowing from abroad. For example, the data in table 11 are consistent
with the proposition that the Argentine and Mexican currencies were
severely overvalued in 1981, and Korea’s currency much less so, if at all.
This interpretation is supported by estimates showing massive capital
flight from Argentina and Mexico, but not from Korea, during the early
1980s.8 Moreover, the wider fluctuations in the Argentine and Mexican
exchange rates surely generated greater uncertainty among potential
investors in those countries. Such fluctuations in exchange rates for
developing country currencies were sometimes associated with abrupt
changes in government policies.
These six hypotheses are hardly the full explanation of why
growth-cum-adjustment has failed to materialize in the heavily indebted
countries, but we doubt that any full explanation could omit them.
7 See, for example, The World Bank (1988b, p. 78); Sachs (1987); and Balassa et al.
(1986, pp 13-14).
s For estimates that probably are upper bounds, see The World Bank (1985, p. 64).IMBALANCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 77
Why Is Debt Being Serviced?
Even though the heavily indebted countries have not been able to
resume growth in per capita GDP, they generally continue to pay
interest on their indebtedness. What determines the interest that the
developing countries pay? The answer may require a dynamic, general
equilibrium model of the world polity and economy. Here we present
only a preliminary regression analysis that may offer some insights for
more comprehensive modelling.
To begin with, if a country were both willing and able to meet its
obligations, its interest payments would simply be a function of its
outstanding indebtedness. Different classes of debt would, of course,
entail different rates of interest. But the record is clear that countries
differ in both ability and willingness to pay. An obvious index of ability
to pay is per capita income. Another such index may be export receipts,
since such receipts provide foreign exchange with which to service debt
in the absence of net capital inflows (provided, of course, that the
country economizes on imports).
What determines willingness to pay is more conjectural; change in
per capita income seems a logical economic determinant. In addition,
countries with large export receipts would generally be more vulnerable
to trade sanctions or interruptions of trade credit, and on this count
would have greater incentive to service their foreign debt. Thus, the
volume of export receipts may affect willingness as well as ability to pay.
These considerations lead to the following model:
(I/Y)i = a + b~(LGD/Y)i + b2(C/Y)i + b3(LPD/Y)i + b4(P/Y)i
+ bs(X/Y)i + b6&(P/Y)i + ei,
where I = total interest payments on long-term external debt,
public and private,
Y = GNP,
LGD = long-term public (and publicly guaranteed) external
debt, excluding debt on concessional terms,
C = long-term public external debt on concessional
terms,
LPD = long-term private (nonguaranteed) external debt,
P = population,
X = exports of goods and services,
e = the error term,
and the subscript, i, represents the country.
The parameters were estimated by ordinary least squares. Available
data permitted 79 developing countries to be included in the sample. All
debt is the average for the year-ends 1981-86. Other variables are
averages for 1982-86, with two exceptions: (P/Y), which is the average of78 Nor~nan S. Fieleke
population for 1982 and 1986 divided by the average GNP for 1982-86,
and ~(P/Y), which is the percentage change in population per unit of
GNP between 1982 and 1986. Population data are in millions, and other
underlying data are in millions of U.S. dollars.9
The estimated equation is as follows, with t statistics in parentheses:
(I/Y)i = 0.003 + 0.056(LGD/Y)i - 0.110(C/Y)i + 0.138(LPD/Y)i
(0.92) (9.26)       (-0.68)    (8.21)
-0.776(P/Y)i + 0.014(X/Y)I - 0.00004A(P/Y)i. R2 = 0.79.
(-1.09)    (2.76)     (-1.23)
The data are long-period averages, and it would be gratifying to
believe that the explanatory variables were fully exogenous, reflecting
basic structural differences among countries but not phenomena af-
fecting the explanatory and dependent variables jointly. We refrain from
such wishful thinking, and take the results as suggestive only.
What is suggested, then, is that--at the margin and other things
equal--the developing countries have been paying on their long-term
private debt a rate of interest more than twice that on their long-term
government debt (excluding concessional debt). Concessional debt
increments seem to have been truly concessional, yielding no interest.
As expected, higher exports may contribute to higher interest payments.
Although the remaining parameters bear the expected signs, they are
not significantly different from zero.
The ultimate test of creditworthiness, of course, is not how much
interest is paid but whether debt is serviced on schedule. Thus, a
number of studies have sought to identify the factors that determine
whether developing country debt is rescheduled. One very recent and
imaginative analysis concludes that a country is more likely to undergo
rescheduling, and to experience deep secondary market discounts on its
debt, if it has a highly unequal income distribution, a low share of
agriculture in GNP, a low per capita income, and an inward-oriented
trade policy (Berg and Sachs 1988). The first two of these explanatory
variables are presumed to make for political instability and poor gov-
ernment management of fiscal policy.
Rescheduling, while a nuisance, nonetheless evidences that a
debtor country has at least worked out an agreement with its creditors,
so that debt servicing remains on schedule, albeit a more relaxed
schedule. By contrast, arrears signify an inability or unwillingness to
service debt on any mutually acceptable schedule.1° As table 12 shows,
9 Population data are from IMF (1987). Other data are from The World Bank (1988c).
m Arrears are simply payments that a country owes but fails to make on schedule (or
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Table 12
Payments Arrears by Heavily Indebted Developing Countries, 1982-87
Millions of U.S. Dollars
Total
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1982-87
Argentina 2,654 304 910 -2,393 -991 415 899
Bolivia 76 32 545 353 334 272 1,612
Brazil 0 2,192 -2,231 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C6te d’lvoire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ecuador 191 -46 118 -279 -15 0 -31
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nigeria 3,216 1,966 1,023 460 387 1,079 8,131
Peru 0 0 1,284 1,282 1,541 1,603 5,710
Philippines 0 1,095 628 - 1,096 0 0 627
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yugoslavia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Data show arrears incurred or discharged (-) each year.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics 39: Yearbook, Part 1, 1988,
five of the heavily indebted countries reportedly accumulated net
arrears over the period 1982-87. At least for Nigeria and Peru, the sums
were sizable. Ecuador, on the other hand, discharged arrearages over
these years, as did Brazil for the period 1982-86.
The curiosity is that arrears have not been greater. The customary
explanation is that countries service their debts for fear of being cut off
from new loans. However, for several years the net new lending
extended to the heavily indebted countries (their current account deficit)
has been dwarfed by their interest payments (table 1). Indeed, net
outward financial transfers from Latin America, whether measured as a
percent of GDP or as a percent of exports, reportedly have exceeded the
famous war reparations payments by Germany and rival the payments
made by France following the Franco-Prussian War. If the trade surplus
is a reliable index, Latin American real transfers clearly exceed those
associated with the French and German reparations, according to the
data in table 13.
Even if the heavily indebted countries could reasonably expect
substantial net loans, recent theorizing indicates that the threat of denial
of such future credit is not necessarily sufficient to deter default in the
present (Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz 1986). The cost of being denied
credit is having to endure wider fluctuations in consumption, or having
to stockpile foreign-exchange reserves with which to smooth consump-80 Norman S. Fieleke
Table 13
War Reparations, Net Outward Financial Transfers, and Trade Surpluses for




(Latin America)" Trade Surplus
Percent Percent of
Country and Period of GDPb Exportsc
France, 1872-75 5.6 30.0







Latin America, 1982-85 4.2 25.7 4.3 31.1
Argentina 6.0 41.4 5.9 48.0
Brazil 2.9 24.2 3.7 34.6
Colombia -.3 -2.8 -2.8 -25.0
Costa Rica -.3 -1.2 -.4 -1.5
Chile 3.3 14.2 2.6 14.3
Ecuador 4.5 19.6 6.6 32.2
Mexico 7.9 42.1 7.0 46.8
Peru .8 4.6 2.3 15.8
Uruguay 5.3 20.8 4.6 23.7
Venezuela 9.3 33.6 11.2 43.3
Note: All data should be treated as estimates.
a For France, reparations of F 5,000 million under 1871 peace treaty of Frankiurt ending Franco-Prussian
War; for Germany, reparations of RM 10,720 million in currency and payments in kind as prescribed in
1919 Treaty of Versailles; for Latin America, net inflow of capital minus net payments of interest and
profits.
b National income rather than GDP for France and Germany.
c Assumed to be goods, for France and Germany, and goods and services, for Latin America.
Source: Andres Bianchi, "Adjustment in Latin America, 1981~6." In Growth-Oriented Adjustment
Programs, Vittorio Corbo et al., eds. 1987. pp. 206-207.
tion. Unless the borrowing country is extremely risk averse or faces a
highly uncertain income stream, this cost may not seem high compared
to the cost of repaying outstanding loans.
Thus, the economic incentive to service outstanding debt may arise
mainly from considerations other than the net benefit of future net
borrowing. One such consideration is the benefit of future gross borrow-
ing, especially the borrowing that finances international trade. Even
though a country may be a net creditor, its trade can be unsettled by a
trade credit embargo.
The legal remedies available to the creditors of a defaulting sover-
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significantly expanded since World War II.n Before 1945 foreign gov-
ernments were virtually immune from suit in the courts of the United
States or the United Kingdom, the two major creditor countries. But as
governments began to participate more fully in activities that previously
had been the domain of private commerce, sovereign international
borrowing came to be construed as a commercial activity. Today,
therefore, courts within the United States and the United Kingdom will
hear the requests of private creditors for sanctions against defaulting
sovereign borrowers. And assets of the borrower that are used or held
outside its territory for commercial purposes may be seized or attached,
in most Western countries, especially if the loan contract contains the
customary waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the attachment
of assets. Especially relevant is the right of banks to set off deposits
owned by a defaulting borrower against unpaid loans.
Of course, a sovereign borrower planning to default might well take
pains to shift its assets beyond the jurisdiction of courts that might seize
them. Nonetheless, creditors could obtain orders of attachment for any
future assets (including exports) of the debtor government or its
instrumentalities that might come within the jurisdiction of the credi-
tors’ courts. Such action would give priority within that jurisdiction to
the claims of these creditors over any new obligations incurred by the
debtor. Thus, the debtor government would have difficulty in arranging
new purchases, unless it could persuade suppliers to accept promised
payments in jurisdictions other than those protective of creditors.
Defaulting governments may also face other costs. For example,
under the Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, countries defaulting on
debts to U.S. citizens are to be denied trade preferences; and if claims
are outstanding against a country in U.S. courts, U.S. representatives to
the multilateral lending institutions are to vote against loans to that
country.
Thus, the costs that may be incurred by defaulting are not limited to
the curtailment of credit per se. The total costs seem to have been a
significant deterrent. Among the heavily indebted countries, only a few
have approached a state of "confrontational default." Peru is one.
Having declared in July 1985 that its debt-service payments would be
limited to 10 percent of its export earnings, Peru proceeded to amass
arrears and showed little willingness to compromise with its creditors.
Peru’s experience is instructive. In order to reduce the nation’s
vulnerability to legal sanctions that might be sought by creditors, the
government shifted most of its foreign-exchange reserves into accounts
that would be less open to seizure. In particular, the country’s entire
gold reserves, some 70 tons, were recalled from Zurich to Lima in
See Alexander (1987, ch. II) and Kaletsky (1985).82 Norman S. Fieleke
February 1986. Since that date, however, reserves have dwindled. Peru
also formulated contingency plans to circumvent any efforts to disrupt
its merchandise trade. To thwart such efforts, the country would seek to
channel its trade transactions so as to avoid holding title to goods within
court jurisdictions friendly to creditors. According to estimates by
Peruvian officials themselves, the cost of circumventing trade sanctions
imposed after an outright default would range from 10 to 15 percent of
the value of commodity trade (Alexander 1987, p. 46). On September 28,
1988, the Government relaxed its confrontational posture, announcing
its intent to clear its arrears with the IMF and World Bank.12
Brazil, too, has been confrontational. On February 20, 1987, the
Brazilian government announced an indefinite suspension of interest
payments on most of its debt to foreign commercial banks. In February
of the following year, however, Brazil indicated its readiness to resume
those interest payments in conjunction with a debt rescheduling and
new loans on terms more favorable to creditors than the nation had
earlier been willing to accept. At the time, President Sarney conceded,
"The fact is that we can’t destroy the international financial system. We
can scratch it, but it can destroy us.’’13 And Jose Luis Machinea,
president of Argentina’s central bank, concluded, "It has been demon-
strated that the costs of a moratorium, such as cuts in credit lines and
other losses, are greater than the benefits.’’14
The costs of a moratorium are not limited to those imposed by a
government’s external creditors. If a government refuses to service its
external debt, doubts surely arise as to whether it will service its internal
debt. A government that does not honor its obligations abroad may
encounter greater difficulty in marketing them at home, and the interest
it saves from nonpayment to external creditors may be partly offset by
higher risk premiums demanded by resident creditors. More generally,
all investors, especially foreigners, may become more fearful that the
government will take additional measures to raise its revenues or
foreign-exchange holdings at their expense. Thus, aggregate investment
in the nation’s economy may be suppressed.15
In sum, both logic and recent history suggest that unilaterally
"laying down the law" toward creditors is unprofitable for a debtor, or
12 "World Bank Appears Eager to Return Peru to Fold," Journal of Commerce,
September 30, 1988.
13 Alan Riding, "Brazil Seeks to Mend Ties with Lenders," The New York Times,
February 15, 1988.
14 Alan Riding, "Brazil’s Reversal of Debt Strategy," The New York Times, February 22,
1988.
15 Lawrence J. Brainard argues that Brazil’s moratorium had this effect (1988, pp.
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at least less profitable than genuine bargaining.16 For creditors, too,
compromise is generally preferable to declarations of default. The
willingness of creditors to bargain is clear; they have not declared
defaults even for borrowers with substantial arrears and confrontational
postures.
The bargaining position of U.S. commercial banks has strengthened
since the onset of the debt crisis, in that much smaller percentages of
their assets and capital are accounted for by loans to heavily indebted
developing countries. Loans to these countries from all U.S. banks
amounted to 129 percent of bank capital at the end of 1982, but had been
reduced to 54 percent of bank capital by September 1988. For the nine
money center banks, the corresponding percentages were 193 and 96
(table 14). As a consequence, the banks were under less pressure to
"’throw good money after bad," a matter taken up in the next section.
The Issue of Debt Relief
While the commercial banks have not issued declarations of default,
neither have they announced forgiveness of outstanding debts. Yet
some measure of forgiveness might be in their own self-interest.
It is well known that at times it can be in the interest of a creditor to
"throw good money after bad." Suppose a new firm borrows $500,000 to
finance the purchase of machinery with which to manufacture an
established product.17 Suppose that a new health or safety standard is
then promulgated, rendering the output of the machinery unsalable and
confronting the new firm with bankruptcy. Assume that for $100,000 the
machinery could be modified to manufacture a product that satisfied the
new health or safety standard, and that the return would not only repay
the added $100,000 with interest, but nearly all of the original $500,000
investment. In this case, the lender would be foolhardy not to throw
good money after bad, especially since the firm, if surviving, might
manage eventually to repay all funds borrowed.
This kind of thinking played an important role in the immediate
aftermath of the 1982 Mexican debt crisis. Developing countries that
could not meet their interest payments received new loans from their
creditor banks in the hope that adjustment programs facilitated by the
new loans would enable the repayment of most, if not all, of the
outstanding debt. In Cline’s terminology, rational creditors "will pro-
vide additional new loans as long as (a) the reduction in the probability
16 Bolivia may be an exception. See Sachs (1988b, pp. 29-32).
17 To keep things (overly) simple, assume that $500,000 is the full cost of the
machinery. (History suggests that lenders can sometimes be imprudent.)Table 14
U.S. Bank Claims on Developing Countries, 1980-88
All U.S. Banks with Significant Foreign Banking Operations
As Percent of
Nine Money Center Banks
As Percent of
Billions of Dollars Total Bank Assets Total Bank Capitala Billions of Dollars Total Bank Assets Total Bank Capitala
All All All All All All
Devel- Deve!- Devel- Devel- Devel- Deve!-
oping Heavily oping Heavily oping Heavily oping Heavily oping Heavily oing Heavily
End of Coun- Indebted Coun- Indebted Coun- Indebted Couno Indebted Coun- Indebted Coun- Indebted
Period tries Countries tries Countries tries Countries tries Countries tries Countries tries Countries
1980 96.8 67.5 9.1 n.a, 169.8 n.a. 63.5 n.a. 12.0 n,a. 264.6 n.a.
1981 115.8 81.5 9.9 n.a. 184.7 n.a. 74.0 n,a. 13.1 n.a. 283.5 n.a.
1982 128.3 91.1 !0.2 7.2 !81.7 !29.0 82.0 55.9 13.9 9.5 282.8 192.8
1983 132.9 94.2 9.9 7.1 167,6 118.8 84.7 57.8 14,6 9.9 268.9 183.5
1984 129.9 95,4 9.2 6.8 140.9 103.5 83.8 60,0 !4.2 10.2 228.3 163.5
1985 119.0 90.5 7.8 5,9 112.9
1986 108.6 86.2 6.7 5.3 93.5
1987 100.2 81.7 6.1 5.0 77.6
Sept. 1988 88.9 73.6 5.3 4.4 65.4
Note: Data are for domestic and foreign offices of the banking organizations
a Capital includes equity, debentures, and reserves for loan losses.
n,a.: not available.
85.9 78.3 58.9 12.6 9.5 !85.I 139.2
74.2 71.7 56.4 11.2 8.8 153,5 120.8
63.2 67.1 54.6 10.7 8.7 130.3 106.0
54.2 61,9 51.8 9.9 8.3 1 !4.2 95.6
and cover only cross-border and nonlocal currency lending.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Country Exposure Lending Survey," Statistical Release E.16 (126), various issues.IMBALANCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 85
of country default thereby achieved, multiplied by previously outstand-
ing loans, exceeds (b) the terminal probability of default (after the new
loans) as multiplied by the amount of the new loans" (Cline 1984, p. 72).
Lending motivated by such a calculus was "forced," or "involuntary,"
or "defensive," in the sense that it would not have occurred if the
lenders had held no previously outstanding claims on the debtors.
The volume of new lending to the heavily indebted countries was
not sustained for long, however. The Baker Plan called for $20 billion in
new loans from commercial banks over the three years ending with
1988, a target that is not being attained. Apparently, additional lending,
as evaluated b~ the banks, did not satisfy Cline’s criterion. The figure
suggests the reason; deepening and then large discounts in the second-
ary market implied that new loans had failed to raise the value of those
previously outstanding, and banks no doubt assumed that additional
new loans would have a market value well below their book value.
It is a short step to ask whether it could be in the interest of creditors
not to extend additional loans but to forgive some of the loans outstand-
ing, or to extend equivalent concessions. The step is short because
defensive lending itself contains a concessionary element, namely, the
expected loss on the new lending (element (b) in Cline’s formula). The
case for partial forgiveness, then, is an elaboration of the case for
defensive lending.
In the machinery example, the firm might be reluctant to modify
and operate the equipment in exchange merely for the additional
$100,000 loan, perhaps preferring termination to the prospect of opera-
tion with no net profit. But if the lender were willing to share the gain
from the additional loan and modifications, the firm might respond
positively. Forgiving part of the loans would be one form of sharing by
the lender. Having shared in the borrower’s current ill-fortune, how-
ever, the lender might insist on sharing in any future good fortune, such
as a cost-reducing change in regulatory standards. Thus, pure loan
forgiveness would not be so attractive from the lender’s standpoint as
making repayment of part of the loan contingent upon future good
fortune.
This crude example introduces the key issues raised by recent
theorizing concerning the effects of debt forgiveness on the incentives
for borrowers to repay.18 In general, a debtor country can, through
adjustment effort in the present (such as curtailing consumption in favor
of investment), augment its output that will be available in the future for
debt service or for domestic absorption. As Corden has elegantly
demonstrated, debt forgiveness, in the proper circumstances and the
proper dosage, can make both borrowers and lenders better off (Corden
See especially Corden (1988), Krugman (1988), and Sachs (1988a).86 Norman S. Fielel~e
1988). For this result to hold, so large a share of any future increase in
the debtor’s output--an increase gained from reducing current con-
sumption--must be destined for debt service (in the absence of forgive-
ness) as to discourage the borrower from cutting back further on current
consumption. In these circumstances, a measure of forgiveness, allow-
ing the country to retain more of future output increases, could provide
the requisite incentive for an adjustment effort that would generate extra
output sufficient to meet much of the original debt-service obligation.
Once forgiveness had been declared, it could be rendered unr~ec-
essary by a favorable change in the debtor’s environment, such as a
reduction in world interest rates or an improvement in the debtor’s
terms of trade. In principle, then, forgiveness should be linked to the
nonoccurrence of such favorable developments, and withheld if they
occur. To grant this point, however, is to compromise the case for
forgiveness. Reschedulings--or at least retention of the original claims--
seem preferable as long as any prospective change in the debtor’s
circumstances might allow eventual repayment in full. The problem, as
always, is foretelling the future.
Moreover, as a general rule, commercial banks have shown little
inclination to bear the risks of changes in the environment..Exhibit A is
their growing reliance over the years on variable rather than fixed rates
on their loans to developing countries.19 Clearly, the banks have
preferred that the borrowers bear the risks of changes in interest rates.
How to deal with such environmental changes is not the only
obstacle to implementing forgiveness in an efficient way, so as to
improve the welfare of both lenders and borrowers. To predict the
debtor country’s response to forgiveness--to ensure that forgiveness
enhances rather than diminishes adjustment effort--one must estimate
the country’s marginal efficiency of investment (or, more broadly, the
marginal efficiency of adjustment effort) and the country’s intertemporal
utility function, as well as the minimum level of absorption that the
country will accept (given its range of prospective output). Preparing
accurate estimates of these parameters would require a certain sagacity.
To be sure, essentially the same parameters had to be evaluated, at least
implicitly, by creditors at the time the currently outstanding loans were
committed, but the current status of the loans forcefully testifies to the
difficulty of the undertaking.
Given the difficulties of ensuring that forgiveness wi!l be efficient, it
is not surprising that forgiveness thus far has been reserved for the
"basket cases," for cases where it is generally agreed that per capita
income is extraordinarily low, the marginal efficiency of investment is
~9 The World Bank (1988a, p. 3), presents data on the rising share of variable rate debt
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negligible, and nonpayment of debt service is fully attributable to
"inability" rather than "unwillingness" to pay.2° Thus, in practice,
whether to forgive becomes more nearly a structural than a marginal
calculation.
The Puzzle of Pre-Crisis Lending
One of the puzzles about lending to the heavily indebted countries
is why such a large volume of loans was extended in the first place. At
the time--before 1982--the lending was justified, or at least rational-
ized, on several plausible grounds. The losses experienced by banks on
international loans had been proportionately lower than on domestic
loans. Many developing countries had compiled much better economic
growth records than the industrial countries had, and the officially
published indicators of developing country creditworthiness had not
been flashing red, at least not for long and not uniformly.
What is puzzling is that these favorable considerations should have
so heavily outweighed the costs and risks peculiar to international
lending. Among the deterrents are the difficulty and expense of acquir-
ing information about proposed foreign investments, and also varied
political risks, such as the relatively high uncertainty of recovering on
defaulted foreign obligations through legal proceedings. As pointed out
by this writer as early as 1971, these deterrents imply that international
capital flows should fall short of, rather than exceed, the optimal levels
(Fieleke 1971, pp. 18-20).
One way to discourage excessive bank exposure in the future is to
raise bank capital requirements, an action in fact recently taken. Another
precautionary measure would be to promote the use of seniority clauses
in future loan contracts. Fewer loans might have been made to the
developing countries during the years immediately preceding the debt
crisis had those loans been subordinated to ones already outstanding.21
Conclusion
The debt crisis has elicited a sizable balance-of-payments adjust-
ment in the 15 heavily indebted developing countries. The adjustment,
however, was concentrated--at least in quantitative terms--in the years
20 Not all the impediments to efficient forgiveness are reviewed here. Others include
the problems of moral hazard and free riders.
21 To give practical force to seniority might be difficult; see Bulow and Rogoff (1988, p.
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immediately following the onset of the crisis, and might have been more
efficient if executed more gradually. Associated with the adjustment
were reductions in import volumes and absorption in most countries.
GNP growth has typically been minimal, and GNP growth rates across
countries are uncorrelated with balance-of-payments adjustment in real
terms. The burden of restraining absorption has fallen primarily on
gross domestic investment; this is not to say that greater investment
would necessarily have been productive. For about half of the countries,
the difficulty of the adjustment has been compounded by an adverse
shift in the terms of trade.
In spite of the adjustment that has occurred, the creditworthiness of
the heavily indebted countries, as evaluated by conventional indexes,
has not improved. Nor has economic growth per capita been resumed.
Several hypotheses for the failure of growth to accompany adjustment
have been set forth in this paper.
Notwithstanding their economic straits, the heavily indebted coun-
tries generally continue to pay interest on their indebtedness. A regres-
sion analysis suggests that these interest payments are positively related
to export receipts (as a fraction of GNP). Debtors continue to service
their debts not only for the sake of future creditworthiness, but to avoid
disruption of trade and other penalties.
In theory, partial forgiveness of indebtedness can sometimes be in
the interest of the lender as well as the borrower. In practice, it is hard
to know when the conditions for this mutually rewarding outcome are
satisfied. Thus, forgiveness is rare.
Theory also suggests that international capital movements should
generally fall short of, rather than exceed, the optimum, yet the opposite
seems to have been true for the heavily indebted countries before 1982.
Perhaps greater use of seniority clauses in loan contracts could help to
dampen herd instincts in the future.
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Ariel Buira*
Norman Fieleke has provided us with a rich and thoughtful study
as well as a wealth of important statistical analyses of the adjustment
process in heavily indebted developing countries over the past six years.
While I find myself in agreement with the thrust of his paper, a number
of points merit some discussion from a debtor’s perspective.
I would like to center my comments on four broad areas dealt with
in the paper:
(1) why growth has not accompanied adjustment in heavily in-
debted countries;
(2) the characteristics of the adjustment process in these countries;
(3) the issue of their creditworthiness; and
(4) future economic growth, debt service and debt relief.
Fieleke puts forward several hypotheses to explain why growth-
cure-adjustment has failed to materialize. I would view the failure of the
strategy of adjustment with growth in a broad perspective: the condi-
tions considered essential to make this strategy viable have not been
fulfilled.
As was widely publicized following the statement of Secretary
Baker before the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank in Seoul in October 1985, the attainment of
adjustment with growth in heavily indebted countries rested on four
assumptions:
(1) economic adjustment and structural change in debtor nations;
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(2) healthy growth of the world economy;
(3) adequate banking flows to the debtor countries; and
(4) greater involvement of multilateral institutions in financing and
structural change in these nations.
A number of debtor countries have fulfilled the role they were
supposed to play in the strategy of adjustment with growth. The ratio of
the government budget deficit to GNP in many highly indebted coun-
tries has fallen significantly,t Important progress has also been made in
the process of structural change through trade liberalization, the re-
moval of price controls, and streamlining and privatization of public
enterprises. Another indicator of the magnitude of efforts made is the
sharp depreciation of these countries’ real effective exchange rates and
the reduction of their consumption and import levels.
Nevertheless, it is now apparent that adjustment with growth
cannot be attained in the absence of the other elements of the strategy.
Both the evolution of the world economy and the volume of financial
flows have shown a behavior inconsistent with adjustment with growth
in debtor nations. Although economic growth in the industrial countries
has been satisfactory, the terms of trade of heavily indebted countries
have fallen to unprecedented levels and, for many, continue to decline.
This point bears some elaboration, since on the basis of statistics in the
IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook, the loss of purchasing power of the
exports of the 15 highly indebted countries can be estimated at $120
billion over the period 1981-87, an amount equivalent to 25 percent of
their external debt. In addition, protectionism has increased, real
interest rates continue to be high and show an upward trend, and the
net transfer of resources from the commercial banks and multilateral
institutions as a group to the heavily indebted countries remains
negative.
Given the unfavorable external environment, adjustment in these
nations has relied excessively on the Contraction of domestic spending,
adversely affecting investment levels and development potential. Thus,
instead of adjustment with growth, debtor nations have followed an
arduous path of adjustment with recession.
The results of the policies adopted have been mixed. On the one
hand, a collapse of the international financial system has been avoided
and commercial banks have gained time to strengthen their capital base.
1 For instance, a recent IMF study reports that between 1981 and 1987 the fiscal defidt
of Argentina fell from 16.4 percent of GDP to 9 percent; that of the Ivory Coast from 11.6
percent to 7.5 percent, and that of the Philippines from 5.5 percent to 3.2 percent. In
addition, the operational balance in Mexico recorded a surplus of 2 percent of GDP in 1987
after having shown a deficit of more than 10 percent of GDP in 1981, while that of Brazil
fell from 5.9 percent to 5.5 percent of GDP in the same period. See International Monetary
Fund, Issues in Managing the Debt Situation, EBS/88/159, August 1988.92 Ariel Buira
But, on the other, debtor countries have not been able either to restore
creditworthiness or to resume economic growth.
Let me now briefly turn to the characteristics of the adjustment
process in the heavily indebted countries. Fieleke notes that the dynam-
ics of adjustment in these nations seem both suboptimal and halting,
and he concludes that aggregate adjustment may virtually have stalled.
To me this seems the natural result of the transfer problem, given the
low ratio of imports to total demand, coupled with adjustment without
financing. Adjustment through the contraction of demand has a limit, at
least politically, especially if you take into account the adverse evolution
of the terms of trade, adjusted for interest rates, which have largely
offset the adjustment efforts of many debtor countries and obstructed
the structural transformation of their economies. As a result, for many
countries the 1980s are the lost decade, in which they lost the gains
achieved in two previous decades of development. The presence of debt
fatigue under these circumstances should not be surprising.
One cannot but agree with Fieleke that economic adjustment might
have been more efficient if executed more gradually. However, when
liquidity dries up there is no choice. The adjustment process was often
abrupt, not because of an unconstrained choice by the debtor countries,
but as a result of the unavailability of net financing. From this perspec-
tive, Fieleke’s search for ways to diminish bank exposure to debtor
nations in the future would seem far from what is required.
I cannot help feeling that the difficulties of the task of adjustment
for heavily indebted countries were underestimated in 1982 and 1985.
One simply has to pay regard to the limitations imposed by the external
debt itself on the adjustment process and to the inherent conflict that
exists between depreciation and stabilization. Recall that in a number of
countries, interest payments on the external debt account for a large
share of domestic savings and of the public deficit. Thus, stabilization
policies often fail, as the sharp depreciation of the real exchange rate that
is required to generate trade balance surpluses in order to service the
external debt also accelerates inflation: this forces domestic interest rates
up, thereby further increasing pressures on the fiscal deficit.
It took time for us to recognize the heavy fiscal burden that external
debt obligations represent for debtor countries. Since most of the debt is
public, governments of debtor countries face the problem of extracting
resources from the private sector in order to effect the transfer abroad
implied by debt service. The difficulties of this process often lead to high
rates of inflation. Also, the crowding out of private investment By
government deficits is closely linked to the need to comply with external
debt service. Indeed, with adequate flows from abroad to finance fiscal
deficits, such crowding out need not take place and adjustment with
growth becomes possible.DISCUSSION 93
With respect to exports, Fieleke raises the question whether the
export effort has been sufficient. Whatever the answer, allow me to
make some observations. If exports are to be more than the mere sale of
domestic surplus production or of the use of spare capacity because the
domestic market is depressed, new investment,is needed to shift
resources towards the production of tradeables. However, the invest-
ment required for this reallocation of resources is not likely to be
forthcoming in a situation of crisis and instability, where perceived
uncertainties and risks are large and call for high risk premiums.
Several components contribute to the atmosphere of uncertainty.
On the domestic side, these relate to questions such as. the credibility of
government policies and their permanence--not just fiscal policy, but also
policies such as trade liberalization and real exchange rates. Doubts
often reflect past responses to balance of payments crises. Political
considerations such as the approach of elections and their results also
give rise to uncertainty. The high level and variability of real interest
rates, often in excess of 20 percent per annum, discourage investment.
On the external side, the persistent atmosphere of crisis .arises from
the "short leash" and "muddling through" approach to the debt
problem on the part of creditors. For years, protracted program negoti-
ations with the Fund, the World Bank and with commercial banks have
taken place annually, with questions as to whether the next quarterly
targets will be met. These make for an atmosphere of "wait and see."
Additional uncertainties relate not only to terms of trade, interest
rates and exchange rat6s but, more importantly, to protectionism. The
latest World Bank President’s Report to the Development Committee is
particularly clarifying in this connection.2 It states that protectionism has
increased in coverage and intensity in developed countries during the
1980s, particularly through nontariff barriers; these, according to the
report, cover roughly one-third of developed country imports of man-
ufactures from major developing country exporters. The report stresses
that protectionism in the industrial countries has been chiefly aimed at
the industrially more advanced LDCs. Thus, an expansion of the
volume of exports by heavily indebted countries that is slightly below
that recorded by world trade can hardly be surprising. Allow me to
recall: OECD subsidies to agriculture amount to $185 billion per year.
Secondly, note that measured in value terms, Mexico’s exports in-
creased 33 percent over the period 1980-87; however, in volume terms,
the increase was a staggering 108 percent, which speaks of the effort
made. The terms of trade loss for Mexico is estimated at $57 billion over
this period (or $30 billion in the period 1982-87).
2 See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, President’s Report to the
Development Committee, August 4, 1988.94 Ariel Buira
Let us now turn to the issue of creditworthiness. Fieleke’s warnings
on the usefulness of certain debt indicators in order to measure
creditworthiness are well taken. It is to be hoped that commercial
bankers will be aware of these caveats when the recent improvement in
debt service ratios of LDCs is incorrectly used as an argument to claim
an increase in their capacity to service the external debt.
Among the range of indicators available to try to assess a debtor
country’s creditworthiness, two are stressed in Fieleke’s paper: capital
flight and the secondary market valuation of developing country debt. I
would like to stress that even if the government of an indebted country
follows "correct" macroeconomic policies, capital flight might take
place, since investors recognize that, given the existence of a debt
overhang, financial assets remain vulnerable to taxation through infla-
tion and through the depreciation of the exchange rate. Thus, the
public’s perception of the ability of the government to service the
external debt in the face of adverse developments in, say, external
interest rates, oil export prices and prospects for economic activity in the
United States may be an important determinant of capital flight.
Alternatively, the retention of savings may require extremely high real
rates of interest with adverse consequences for government finances. In
other words, capital flight in some countries may in fact be a result of the
uncertainties associated with the external environment and the debt
burden.
Consider now the secondary market price of developing country
loans. While it must be recognized that the evolution of prices in the
secondary markets reflects to some extent the market’s perception of
creditworthiness of debtor countries, other factors enter into play. For
instance, during 1987 the prices on claims of most major debtors
dropped sharply after the decision taken by major U.S. banks to set
aside reserves against potential loan losses, despite the fact that under-
lying economic conditions and therefore creditworthiness were improv-
ing in several of these nations. The reasoning behind this behavior
seems to lie in the fact that the increase in banks’ reserves was perceived
as a signal of a greater bank reluctance to lend new money to debtor
countries. Since bank loans had been used to cover debt service in the
past, when it was feared that no new funds would be forthcoming, the
price of LDCs’ debt in the secondary market immediately fell.
Consider next a major question the paper does not raise directly: Is
it possible, in the current economic environment, for the heavily
indebted countries to grow at adequate levels and at the same time pay
full debt service? I would like to probe deeper into this question by
assessing the prospects faced by Mexico, a country that has been praised
by the international community as a "model" of economic adjustment.
Indeed, over the past six years Mexico has made impressive
progress in both adjustment and structural change. Particularly impor-DISCUSSION 95
tant has been the strengthening of public finances. The primary fiscal
deficit, which computes the difference between public sector revenues
and expenditures excluding interest payments, turned from a deficit of
8 percent of GDP in 1981 to a surplus of 4.9 percent in 1987. An even
greater surplus (7 percent of GDP) is expected for 1988, an adjustment of
15 percent of GDP. Accordingly, the current account switched from a
deficit of 6.5 percent of GDP in 1981 to a surplus of 2.7 percent in 1987.
Substantial advances have been achieved in other areas as well.
Thus, inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, decreased
from an annualized rate of 424 percent in December 1987 to under 10
percent in September 1988. The economy has gone through an unprec-
edented process of import liberalization, whereby most quantitative
restrictions have been eliminated and the average tariff has been
reduced to only 6.5 percent. Exports have been diversified: while in 1982
oil accounted for nearly 80 percent of merchandise exports, as of June
1988 the share of non-oil exports in the total reached 68 percent.
Moreover, the number of public enterprises has been more than halved,
from 1,155 at the end of 1982 to 449 by mid-1988.
Economic adjustment in Mexico has coexisted with a huge net
transfer of resources abroad, equivalent to more than 6 percent of GDP
over the period 1982-87. Partly due to this situation, the measures
adopted have emphasized the contraction of domestic expenditure
(which necessarily exceeds the transfer itself) and in particular of
investment. Over the past six years public investment fell from 10.2
percent of GDP in 1982 to 5.5 percent in 1987.
In this context, annual GDP growth in Mexico, which had averaged
close to 7 percent in the 1960s and 1970s, decreased to -0.2 percent in
the period 1982-87. In the 10-year period from 1977 to 1987, real average
wages in the manufacturing sector dropped by some 30 percent in real
terms and minimum wages by nearly 50 percent. The real levels of per
capita imports and investment in Mexico in 1987 were as low as those
prevailing in the seventies, while real per capita consumption decreased
to the levels of a decade ago. These are all major adjustments greater
than seemed possible six years ago.
Nevertheless, the efforts carried out have not been enough to
restore creditworthiness. Negotiations with foreign creditors have al-
lowed an extension of maturities and a decrease in margins over base
rates. Partly as a result of this, the debt service ratio diminished from 62
percent in 1982 to 42 percent in 1987. But, during the same period, the
ratio of external debt to exports rose from 310 percent to 340 percent,
while the size of the debt in relation to GDP increased from 51 percent
to 74 percent despite no net use of foreign credit.
Although adjustment and structural change have taken place, the
prospects for resuming adequate and sustained rates of economic
growth are uncertain. In particular, it is doubtful that the net transfer of96 Ariel Buira
resources implicit in the present levels of debt service will allow the
financing of a needed expansion of investment.
Exploring the viability of combining adequate rates of growth with
full debt service payments is not an easy endeavor. However, the
comparison of the investment requirements for resuming growth with
the availability of domestic and external resources for this purpose
provides some useful insights.
Mexico’s labor force will grow at a rate of about 3.2 percent a year
during the next five to six years. With an income elasticity of the
demand for labor of around 0.6, the minimum GDP growth required to
absorb the yearly increase in the labor force would be slightly over 5
percent. Assuming that the structural changes mentioned above will
increase considerably the efficiency of investment compared to the
historical standards of the last decade, the economy will need an
investment/GDP ratio of at least 19.5 percent to sustain a 5 percent GDP
growth rate. It must be noted that during the 1960s and 1970s the
investment share of GDP amounted to an average of 23.6 percent.
Currently, despite the fall in real per capita incomes, domestic
savings stand at around 16 percent of GDPo This leaves little leeway for
a rapid mobilization of internal resources. Consequently, to finance an
I/GDP ratio of 19.5 percent, external savings would have to amount to
some 3.5 percent of GDP if economic growth is to attain an annual rate
of 5 percent.
Under optimistic assumptions for the behavior of domestic and
external variables, Mexico would require five to six billion dollars in new
financing from the commercial banks to meet external debt service and
balance the external accounts in this scenario, in addition to all other
financing from direct foreign investment and multilateral and bilateral
sources. This figure evidently does not mesh with the lending plans of
commercial banks. It would be farfetched to think that Mexico could
raise the above-mentioned amount year after year in the voluntary credit
markets.
Consequently, despite enormous adjustment efforts and the struc-
tural change undergone, Mexico’s medium-term prospects remain poor.
Unless debt service can be reduced, with limited new financing forth-
coming the debt burden will translate into low investment levels, low
growth, rising unemployment and speculative capital movements for
the coming years.
Obviously, the situation is even more somber in most other heavily
indebted countries. Under such circumstances, the limitations of the
present debt strategy seem evident and the need for debt relief acquires
crucial importance. Creditor governments and international organiza-
tions must support market-oriented debt reduction schemes linked to
programs of economic reform in debtor nations, if the debt problem is to
be overcome.DISCUSSION 97
We must all understand that this problem goes beyond the eco-
nomic and financial areas. Without tangible benefits, the persistence of
adjustment efforts in debtor countries faces mounting political resis-
tance. Debtor country governments may be tempted or compelled to
turn to populist policies in response to the population’s frustration with
lower living standards, unemployment and stagnation. In that event,
the adverse implications of the debt crisis for debtors, creditors and in
general for the world economy will be substantially accentuated.Discussion
J. David Richardson*
Norman Fieleke presents an attractive summary of the macroeco-
nomic adjustment experience of the "Baker 15" countries since 1982. It
is especially attractive in the cross-country comparisons that highlight
several important generalizations. (1) The first two years’ adjustment by
these 15 countries accounted for nearly all of their increases in net
exports. In only a few cases do we see further success beyond that of the
first two years. (2) Those countries with the fastest rates of GNP growth
among the 15 were no more successful at increasing net exports than
others. (3) Nor were countries that early swallowed the bitter pill of
abnormally deep recession any more successful. (4) Investment spend-
ing bore the heaviest downward adjustment among the Baker 15,
consumption spending the lightest, with government spending in
between.
I will focus my comments on the macroeconomic adjustment
questions that occupy the greatest part of Fieleke’s paper. I was
surprised and instructed by several of his conclusions, but felt the
author could have instructed me even more. For example, the perspec-
tive of the traditional transfer problem appears relevant here. The most
recent World Bank World Development Report reveals that middle-income
debtor countries transferred nearly 100 billion real dollars’ worth of
capital back to creditor countries between 1982 and 1987. In 1982, sizable
inward transfers to the Baker 15 did not merely dry up, they were
reversed. The transfer perspective helps, then, to explain why the
macroeconomic impetus was recessionary in debtor countries, and why
however much income might decline, aggregate purchasing power--the
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stan~tard of living--had to decline more in order to transform trade-
deficit transferees into trade-surplus transferors. Since real depreciation
of its currency is an expected (albeit not necessary) part of the adjust-
ment of a transferor, the decline of the Baker 15’s terms of trade between
1982 and 1987 is not simply more bad luck, but an essentially endoge-
nous adjustment mechanism.1 It too reduces aggregate purchasing
power.
Moreover, I have always been surprised that commentators under-
play the very sizable real capital loss that debtor countries bore at the
beginning of the 1980s, a balance-sheet loss of real national wealth that
independently compressed purchasing power and precipitated the 1982
crisis and ensuing adjustment. The source of the real capital loss is
simple and familiar: capital formation that appeared profitable at the
expected real interest rates of the early 1980s turned out to be quite
unprofitable at the realized real interest rates. The realized real interest
rate over the period 1981-82 was fully 10 percentage points higher than
the expected real interest rate, if we use the inflation forecast of the
January 1981 Economic Report of the President to calculate "expected," and
the actual inflation rate to calculate "’realized": 23 percent inflation
expected over the two-year span versus 13 percent actual.
The real capital loss and transfer perspective help explain both the
dramatic improvement in the trade balance of the Baker 15 and the
equally dramatic decline in their standards of living and terms of trade.
But they do not explain the peculiar mix of trade-balance improvement;
much more import compression occurred than had been expected, and
much less export expansion (zero in value terms, as the paper shows).
I believe that the growth of protectionism in creditor countries is the
key to this puzzle. Not that the Baker 15 were unfairly singled out to
bear the protectionist burden--table I suggests that export growth rates
of many developing countries, including Asian exporters, dropped
nearly 10 percentage points below the 1970-87 trend in the sub-period
from 1982 to 1987. For the fastest growing exporters, however, this
meant a decline from extraordinary to high export growth (20 percent
per year to 10 percent); for the Baker 15 it meant the extinction of high
export growth (12 percent to 2). Table 2 tries to document further that
the Baker 15 were victimized by indiscriminate protectionism in the face
of their commendable but less-than-stellar export growth to start with,
and not by any vendetta of protectionism against them alone. Unfair
trade orders and initiatives increased in the United States more than
threefold between 1983 and 1987 against both the Baker 15 and the
fastest-growing developing-country exporters.
i This is one reason why I don’t find very revealing the author’s counterfactual
simulations at fixed terms of trade toward the end of the first part of his paper.100 J. David Richardson
Table 1







Nine Problem Debtors from "Baker 15’’a
Mexico 17.2 -.3 -17.5
Ecuador 14.9 -1.0 -15.9
Brazil 14,2 5.4 -8.8
Yugoslavia 11.9 2,1 -9.8
Colombia 11.5 8.7 -2.8
Nigeria 10.7 -10,5 -21.2
Morocco 10.6 5.5 -5.1
Philippines 10,4 2.5 -7.9
Uruguay 10.1 3,1 -7.0
Unweighted Average 12.4 1,7 - 10.7
Comparison Group of Nine Fastest-Growing Developing-Country Exportersb
Korea 26.8 16.7 -10.1
Taiwan 23.5 19.2 -4.3
Hong Kong 19.0 18.2 -,8
Singapore 18,7 6.7 - 12,0
Turkey 18.3 12.1 -6.2
China 18.2 12,6 -5.6
Thailand 17.9 10.9 -7,0
Indonesia 17.2 -5.8 -23.0
Tunisia 15.6 1.5 -14.1
Unweighted Average 19.5 10,2 -9.3
a Only these nine "Baker 15" countries were tabulated in the source below.
b The nine developing countries with fastest growing exports from 1970 to 1987, as tabulated in the
source below.
Source: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International Trade 1987/88, Table 13.
The author might also have expanded on the foreboding dynamics
of the incidence of decreased living standards. The Baker 15 are
collectively eating their seed corn, as shown by the particularly large
declines in investment and in government spending (at least some of
which is for maintenance and expansion of productive infrastructure).
Spending on education and on structural adaptation (retooling, retrain-
ing, and the like) might show the same depressing decline if such data
could be distilled from the more familiar aggregates. This is takeoff in
reverse, a crash in a no-growth (negative in per capita terms) valley in
which aggregate poverty leads to underinvestment which leads to theDISCUSSION 101
Table 2
Unfair Trade Initiatives in the United States, 1983 and 1987
Anti- Section
Dumping Countervailing 301 Cases
Cases at Duty Cases during
End of Yeara at End of Yearb Year°





Comparison Group of Nine Fastest-Growing Developing-Country Exportersd
1983                    0                          8                         4
1987 10 34 0
a Anti-dumping orders and findings in effect as of December 31, 1983 or 1987, without regard to effective
date of original action.
b Countervailing duty orders and findings in effect as of December 31, 1983 or 1987, without regard to
effective date of original action.
c Section 301 petitions filed during 1983 or 1987.
d Same nine countries as in table 1.
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report,
1983 (June 1984), pp. 350-51, 358-59, 367-72, and 39th Report, 1987 (July 1988), pp. 5-8 and 5-9,
B-27 and B-28, and B-31 and B-32.
perpetuation of aggregate poverty, and so on--the damning dynamics
of the "underclass" writ large.
The heavy decline in government spending and in elements of
investment, such as construction and imports of capital goods, is due in
part to natural movements in relative prices in the adjustment process.
Tradables prices almost certainly must rise relative to nontradables,
because output must be squeezed out of government and other non-
tradables sectors and into exports and import substitutes. I find it
insightful to remember that the most natural adjustment process for the
Baker 15 establishes a new price hierarchy. It leaves nontradables prices,
including most wages and salaries, lower than normal and lower than
tradables prices within the Baker 15. But tradables prices within the
Baker 15 must end up lower than world tradables prices in order to
generate the needed improvement in the trade balance. The first and last
elements in the hierarchy joined together show once again why stan-
dards of living (the command of Baker 15 incomes over the world’s
goods) must fall if capital is being transferred back to creditor countries,
and must certainly fall relative to the heady days of inward transfer.
As a final point I would like to commend the author for his
regression approach to the experience of the Baker 15. For purposes of
generalizing and making comparisons across countries, a regression is a
useful tool, more akin to a multi-dimensional cross-tabulation than a102 J. David Richardson
causal analysis. It allows estimates of correlations between pairs of
variables (for example, rates of GNP growth and improvement in the
trade balance) conditional on the correlations between other variables
that have interest and influence. The author gives us the beginnings of
a very nice potential longitudinal study of the Baker 15-~to be supple-
mented, I would suggest, by a sample of more successful debtors
(Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Turkey?) to alleviate sampling
biases. Fifteen to 20 countries tracked over roughly 20 years is a
reasonably rich panel of data from which to begin drawing quantitative
inferences and generalizations. I hope the author proceeds to do so, and
I will look forward to the result.